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Do As I Did Not As I Say: Blair, New Labour and party traditions 
 
Karl Pike (Queen Mary University of London) 
and 




Corbynism, to its internal critics, is a ‘hard left’ anachronism. New Labour, to its detractors, 
was basically Thatcherism. We argue these meta narratives, critical to internal identity, 
are flawed. They are pulling the party apart for reasons of political strength and at the 
expense both of broader interpretation and longer term cohesion. Through an analysis of 
‘early’ New Labour, we show how Blair’s project ended is not how it began, and therefore 
isn’t the whole story. The now half-forgotten history of New Labour in opposition holds 
important lessons, including for those trying, for the most part unsuccessfully, to keep the 
‘modernising’ flame alive. If the modernisers are to win more converts to their cause they 
must learn to do what Blair and New Labour did in opposition and not what Blair says 
today. Drawing on the concept of Labour’s ‘ethos’, we offer five lessons from the party’s 
past. 
 






For what sometimes feels like a political lifetime, everyday has been Groundhog Day in 
the Labour Party’s civil war. The precise subject matter – from economic policy to electoral 
strategy – may change but the basic argument remains the same. The remnants of New 
Labour on the party’s ‘modernising’ wing argue the Corbynite leadership does not give 
New Labour any credit for its past achievements; rests upon an outdated and overly 
simplistic critique of neoliberalism and global capitalism; and pays insufficient attention to 
voters at the political centre. Tony Blair has, at times, led this charge, describing Corbyn’s 
project as being comprised of a ‘small group of acolytes from the far Left’.1 The Corbynite 
left, for its part, maintains that New Labour had few, if any, achievements and was 
responsible for many policy disasters; that Blair and his key supporters were, in essence, 
Thatcherites; and that their only ambition was to win elections. Blair was an alien who 
hijacked the party: ‘an SDP viper in the Labour breast.’2 
 
Politicians, commentators, activists and others all know their lines in this argument. We 
want to argue that the histories they batter each other with are, in one important respect, 
flawed. They have become meta narratives, critical to the identity of ‘Corbynites’ and 
‘moderates’, yet pulling the party apart for reasons of political strength at the expense of 
broader interpretation. The comparison both sides make is between what New Labour 
said and did when it was in office – typically during its second and third terms following 
the 2001 and 2005 general elections – and what has happened since. Yet, to our mind, 
the more relevant and interesting comparison is between Corbyn’s period as leader of the 
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opposition, and what New Labour said and did when it was in opposition up to 1997. Blair 
was clearly on the right of the party when he was elected leader in July 1994 and went 
on to proclaim the arrival of ‘New’ Labour as a means of signaling his break with the past. 
We are not going to argue that, deep-down, a misunderstood Blair was a radical socialist 
at heart. But we do maintain that, during this period, New Labour was far more politically 
nuanced than it was later to become. 
 
Blair changed, New Labour’s period in office became an era, and he was increasingly 
detached from his party and many of his colleagues. But how it ended is not how it began, 
and therefore isn’t the whole story – nor the only identity ‘moderates’ today can show 
affinity for. Blair today draws, constantly, a distinction between the ‘politics of protest’ and 
the ‘politics of governance’. His politics, he said, mean he’s the ‘guy on the placard’ rather 
than the person holding it.3 Politicians must show that they are capable of taking tough 
decisions if they are to achieve credibility with ‘ordinary’, centre-ground voters. Yet, whilst 
in opposition, Blair, we want to argue, was quite different, drawing upon key tenets of left-
wing thinking in his assaults upon the Conservatives while adopting policies with 
widespread party appeal. 
 
The now half-forgotten history of this period holds important lessons for those trying, for 
the most part unsuccessfully, to keep the modernising flame alive. Whilst the Labour 
Party’s civil war shows no sign of ending, the modernisers have nevertheless taken a 
decade-long beating. In the 2015 Labour leadership contest, Liz Kendall, the 
modernisers’ candidate, secured 4.5% of the vote. In the 2016 contest, the modernisers 
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voted for Owen Smith but, for the most part, kept a deliberately low profile. The breakaway 
of seven Labour MPs to form the Independent Group further weakened the modernisers’ 
cause. Whatever the fate of Jeremy Corbyn after the next general election, it is clear that 
the Labour Party has, over the last decade, shifted significantly to the left. If the 
modernisers are to win more converts to their cause they must learn to do what Blair and 
New Labour did in opposition and not what Blair says today. They must find ways of 
constructing political alliances across the Party and to avoid the kind of one-sided 
sectarian politics that the left of the party argues New Labour practiced and that the 
modernisers in the party now accuse the Corbynites of replicating. For Corbyn, if he 
achieves power, or if his project continues under different leadership, his supporters must 
begin to recognize the complexity and legitimacy of Labour’s varied traditions. 
 
Blair’s 1982 lecture 
 
In November 1980 Michael Foot narrowly beat Denis Healey, the candidate of the Labour 
right, to become Labour’s leader. Dismayed by Labour’s culture, some MPs broke-away 
and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) entered the political scene. At that time, the 
Conservatives, deeply divided and mired in recession, looked likely to implode. Yet, it did 
not work out that way. The economy slowly began to recover and the invasion of the 
Falkland Islands in April 1982 gave Margaret Thatcher a shot at political redemption. On 
the 27th May 1982, with British forces engaged in the Battle of Goose Green, the 
Conservatives won the Beaconsfield by-election. Labour’s candidate, Tony Blair, came 
third and lost his deposit. A few months later, Blair visited Australia, where he had lived 
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as a child, and delivered a paper to the politics department at Murdoch University in Perth. 
The content of this lecture, while rarely noted in the literature on New Labour, makes for 
fascinating reading. 
 
Blair began by arguing that Labour’s electoral prospects were poor and had been made 
poorer by the SDP. He however showed no sympathy with those who had broken-away. 
The SDP largely appealed to ‘middle-aged and middle-class erstwhile Labour members, 
who have grown too fat and affluent to feel comfortable with Labour and whose lingering 
social consciences prevent them from voting Tory’.4 The SDP was draining voters away 
from Labour but it appealed to those who ‘cluster around anything new’ and ‘profess to 
be non-political’. Raising the stakes, Blair went on to eviscerate the right of the party who 
had remained within Labour. Its leaders had ‘basked for too long in the praise of the leader 
writers of the Financial Times, Times and the Guardian’. Under their stewardship, the 
party had become too timid and predictable. Any Labour Government which followed 
Thatcher would come into ‘sharp conflict with the power of capital, particularly 
multinational capital’. That conflict would be a ‘painful’ but ‘vital’ experience. Blair then 
went on to take aim at the idea that Labour should aim to become the natural party of 
government. A failure to listen had seen Labour’s establishment become ‘managers of a 
conservative country’. 
 
For its part, the left of the Labour Party was culpable because of its dogmatic commitment 
to outdated ideologies (read Marxism) and its naive view that it could win the next election 
on the back of the votes of the working-class and liberal metropolitans. But, at the same 
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time, Blair recognised that the 1979 defeat and the subsequent influx of new, left-wing, 
party activists had changed the party ‘irreversibly’. This was, Blair argued, no bad thing 
in so far as it had invigorated campaigns and stimulated new thinking. He said the 
‘powerful appeal of the left to the fundamental socialist instincts of the Party,’ along with 
an election defeat, had ‘overwhelmed the tired excuses of pragmatism from the Labour 
right ... by  pointing to the election defeat, the left were able to dispose of the continual 
refrain of the right-wing that moderation was essential to the retaining of power.’ 
Moreover, these left-wing activists, dismissed out-of-hand by the right of the party as 
sectarian and divisive, had brought to the party a genuine interest in issues like the 
environment and social equality which were both important and potentially of appeal to 
non-core voters. What was needed, Blair concluded, was a Labour Party which drew on 
elements of, but nevertheless transcended, left and right. 
 
What should we make of Blair’s analysis? 1982 is of course a lifetime ago. Yet, with the 
notable exception of its ‘third way’ approach to overcoming and moving beyond left and 
right, it is striking just how different this Tony Blair sounds. The right-wing breakaways 
who have tired of the left-wing leadership are castigated; the right of the party berated for 
having treated elected office as an end in itself; and left-wing activists welcomed for their 
new thinking on issues like the environment when Blair today has expressed severe 
doubts about the Green New Deal and its talented champions like Alexandria Ocasio-
Cortez.5 It is perhaps tempting therefore to argue that Blair, who was still searching for a 
safe Labour constituency from which to fight the next election, was simply playing it 
politically safe: saying nice, token, things about the left because the left was in the political 
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ascendancy. But this does not feel entirely plausible. Murdoch University was far removed 
from the day-to-day of Labour Party politics and it seems far more likely that Blair, in the 
aftermath of the Beaconsfield by-election, was offering a sincere set of reflections on the 
state of British politics. Furthermore, and looking forward, clear traces of Blair’s thinking 
can be seen in his approach, more than a decade later, to the Labour Leadership. 
 
Blair and socialism 
 
Blair entered parliament in 1983 decrying, in his maiden speech, tax cuts for the ‘wealthy 
and privileged’. Later, as shadow Treasury spokesperson, he described the Conservative 
privatisation programme as a ‘plunder’ akin to the ‘sacking of the monasteries’. By the 
time he became Shadow Home Secretary in 1992, Blair was clearly established with the 
right of the party and the same held true when he contested the 1994 leadership contest: 
beating John Prescott and Margaret Beckett. Yet, in his leadership campaign, Blair’s pitch 
was carefully designed to also appeal to votes on the left of the party. He was 
uncompromising in denouncing Thatcherism for its appeal to ‘self-interest’ and ‘at its 
worst, just greed’. A speech on education policy delivered in Manchester began with a 
tribute to Fabian summer schools and the socialist tradition of self-learning and 
improvement. In talking about welfare, Blair denounced Conservative cuts and, borrowing 
from Harold Wilson and in tribute to John Smith, reminded his audience that ‘the Labour 
Party is crusade for social justice or it is nothing’. Blair was also happy to use and to 
describe himself as a socialist: albeit a socialism which he was careful to demarcate into 
‘ethical’ (good) and ‘scientific’ (bad) strands. In eventually securing 58% of the 
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constituency membership vote, Blair demonstrated a clear capacity to attract support 
beyond the right of the party in a way that simply became unthinkable from the 2000s 
onwards. 
 
Once elected, Blair started to describe Labour as New Labour and, in doing so, seemed 
to serve notice of a fundamental demarcation between what had happened to Labour in 
the past and what it had become. Should we therefore see the tentative appeals offered 
to the left during the leadership campaign as simple and rather meaningless campaign 
sops? Reading ahead to what was to come when New Labour was in office, it is tempting 
to do so. But, at the time, Blair actually went out of his way, unnecessarily given the 
strength of his position, to present New Labour as an exercise in rejuvenating but 
respecting the party’s traditional values. This was the centrepiece of Blair’s Fabian 
pamphlet, Socialism, which argued for greater clarity in the party’s objectives and 
enhanced intellectual self-confidence whilst offering reassurance to party members about 
respecting Labour’s traditions. ‘For almost two decades,’ Blair argued, ‘the left has felt 
itself on the defensive. Having fashioned the post-war consensus of 1945, its intellectual 
confidence became sapped by its own inner doubts, the problems of government in the 
1960s and 1970s and the onslaught of the right through Thatcherism.’6 The solution, he 
suggested was to ‘regain the intellectual high ground, stating with clarity its [Labour’s] true 
identity and historic mission. In doing so, it must show how this is not a break with its past 
or its traditions but, on the contrary, a rediscovery of their true meaning’. As leader of the 
party, Blair was not shy of talking about socialism and his political philosophy. None of 
this is particularly ‘Mondeo man’. 
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To his critics on the left, Blair’s subsequent crusade to rewrite Clause IV of the party’s 
constitution was a demonstration of just how hollow such commitments of fidelity to 
traditional values really were. It certainly feels significant that Blair was willing to push the 
issue in relation to clause IV in a way that his predecessors had shied away from. Yet 
from Gordon Brown’s perspective, which Blair acknowledged, the point of rewriting 
Clause IV was to show that ‘fundamental socialist values endure and continue to inspire, 
which is why they should be clearly reflected in both the Labour Party constitution and in 
Labour Party policy’.7 Besides, it is easy to forget not only that Blair eventually secured 
landslide support for the amendment, but the revised text, while eschewing reference to 
common ownership, was in other respects quite an uncontroversial statement of Labour’s 
creed. 
 
With the Clause IV change approved by March 1995 and with Labour far ahead in the 
polls, Blair nevertheless continued to discuss ideas. For a short while, 
‘communitarianism’, with its Republican emphasis on the rights and duties citizens owe 
to each other and to their government moved into view. Then, in January 1996, Blair 
grabbed, unexpectedly, the language of stakeholding as a shield against accusations that 
he had no real convictions and that Labour would say and do anything to get elected. 
Influenced by the journalist Will Hutton, who had just published The State We’re In, Blair 
argued that the economy was being disfigured by an ideology which viewed firms as ‘mere 
vehicles for the capital market to be traded, bought and sold as a commodity’ and which 
discouraged long-term investment, good relationships with workers, productivity and 
trust. Blair was light on the details of his stakeholding alternative. But the speech was an 
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intentionally radical one, aligning New Labour with long-standing and determinedly left-
wing assaults on British capitalism. David Miliband, then an aide to Blair, was relieved 
that Blair had found a progressive thread for his own narrative on economics. Indeed Blair 
finished his speech with a paean to a future Britain ‘for the many and not the few’. 
 
New Labour’s early policy 
 
Looking beyond the ideological gesturing, what, during this period of opposition, was New 
Labour’s policy record? Blair was constantly under attack from the Conservatives who 
argued that New Labour was a chimera and that, if elected, Blair would be a prisoner of 
the left and of the unions. In response, a strategic decision was taken by the campaign 
team to offer a limited manifesto in 1997 focused upon a small set of specific promises. 
This way, it was hoped, the Conservatives’ attack could be blunted whilst Labour would, 
if elected, be in a better position to deliver upon all of its promises and so deflect the 
charges of betrayal which had been levelled against the leadership by previous 
generations of party leaders. 
 
Yet, in one respect, the process of preparing the manifesto was a radical one and signaled 
a clear break with past practice. In order to be seen to be attracting support from all sides 
of the party, and so to protect the leadership from charges that the party was hopelessly 
divided, Blair experimented with membership votes on an ‘early’ manifesto, and toured 
the country speaking to Labour members and supporters about the party’s policies. This 
was not in any real sense a deliberative form of internal party democracy. It was a take it 
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or leave it approach to endorsing a document. But it was a process that New Labour’s 
leadership nevertheless invested significant time and resource in and one that Blair saw 
as being a part of the solution to the ‘head and body problem’: that of the leadership 
expressing one message (in this case, a modernising one) to a party that seemed 
begrudging at best, and hostile at worst (and wanting a more ‘traditional’ approach). 
 
What of the policies themselves? Looking back, these were an eclectic mix. No doubt still 
scarred by Labour’s 1992 defeat, some of the headline policies were premised upon the 
need to appeal to previously Conservative voters. Most significantly, Labour promised not 
to raise taxes and to abide by Conservative spending plans; leave unchanged the vast 
majority of Conservative trade union reforms; and not to reverse past privatisations. 
These were policies which, quite clearly, the left of the party and, for that matter, much of 
its traditional right-wing found difficult to accept. Labour also attracted much criticism for 
its promises to introduce ‘fast-track’ punishment for young offenders and for elements of 
‘workfare’ compulsion within its plans to reduce youth unemployment. 
 
Yet, at the same time, the 1997 manifesto contained policies which, judged in that context, 
were radical and sometimes innovative and which appealed to voters on the left. Perhaps 
most obviously, Labour retained the commitment it had made in 1992 to a statutory 
minimum wage. It promised to abolish the Conservative’s NHS ‘internal market’ which it 
described as tantamount to privatisation, and also the market-based nursery voucher 
scheme. Constitutionally, New Labour promised to remove hereditary peers from the 
House of Lords; create a devolved Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly; and 
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incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into British law. In a way which 
has since been largely forgotten, New Labour also promised to introduce a ‘windfall tax’ 
upon the privatised utilities. Blair and his close team, including Alastair Campbell, did, as 
the election approached, express concerns that this new tax would alienate business. 
However, they concluded that the political benefits outweighed the potential costs and 
persevered. Gordon Brown was adamant that the public were ready to see politicians 
condemn ‘fats cats’ and boardroom greed. 
 
Lessons for today’s Labour Party 
 
The Labour Party has not won an election for nearly fifteen years. In that time, it has 
experienced remarkable internal change and continues to witness near weekly turmoil. 
We do not have the space here to litigate the rights and wrongs of the last opposition 
decade. Instead we focus on one question: has Labour learnt the right lessons from early 
New Labour? Understandably much of the 2010 defeat fallout, and subsequent 
leadership elections have been defined by discourse on New Labour’s lengthy spell in 
office. This is legitimate and important. The financial crisis posed a challenge to social 
democracy in many countries. The poisonous legacy of the Iraq War will shape public 
and political attitudes to UK foreign policy for generations. And these are just two of the 
issues from Labour’s last period in office. 
 
Yet, having experienced a decade of opposition, we are struck by how Labour’s most 
recent previous spell out of office has either been bundled in with the period in 
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government, or willfully overlooked. There are some signs that among those most 
supportive of Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership – both inside and outside of parliament – that 
the years 1994-1997 have some relevance: for example, in the occasionally mooted 
redrafting of Labour’s aims and objectives. But among those Labour politicians most 
sympathetic to the Blair and Brown years, which Labour’s deputy leader, Tom Watson, 
has attempted to bring together as Labour’s ‘social democratic’ tradition, there remains a 
rather one-dimensional approach of reflecting on the rights and wrong of the last Labour 
government. To conclude, we offer a series of connected lessons from our analysis of 
New Labour’s early history. 
 
First, opposition is very different to governing. This seems obvious, but such was the 
mentality that a generation of Labour politicians left office with in 2010, we think it is an 
essential point. The burdens opposition imposes are different. In particular, it shows the 
benefits of seeking a base of support not only across the electorate but within the party. 
By the time Blair announced his intention to leave office, the contempt the left of the party 
felt toward him was almost limitless. Talk of stakeholding was long-gone and Blair was as 
keen to talk about globalisation and economic competition as he was desperate to avoid 
talking about socialism. Any credit once gained from the minimum wage, significant 
spending increases on the NHS and education and devolution had been more than 
eclipsed by public private partnerships, private sector involvement in the NHS and of 
course Iraq. The feeling of anger was mutual. Blair still occasionally peppered his 
speeches with references to the views of ‘ordinary’ party members in Trimdon. But he 
had long since lost patience with the party he led. 
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In his 2006 conference speech, Blair warned that ‘the danger for us today is not reversion 
to the politics of the 1980s… It is unconsciously to lose the psychology of a governing 
party’.8 This ‘psychology’ was the familiar Blair mantra of taking ‘tough’ decisions, and 
being prepared to be unpopular – at least temporarily – before respect for your ability to 
‘get things done’ won the people back. Yet, whilst in opposition, Blair had played things 
very differently and this was a key part of his success. Blair was sensitive to and, at times, 
respectful of the different political traditions within the Labour Party. Knowing how things 
were to eventually end, it is tempting to see this strategy as being intentionally insincere: 
a ruse to acquire temporary support from the left before securing office. Given the way in 
which we have described how Blair’s approach to opposition was grounded in an analysis 
he had developed in the early 1980s, we don’t find the charge of insincerity particularly 
convincing. Instead, we think it far more likely that, for better or worse, it was the 
experience of governing which changed Blair’s outlook. Yet, regardless of whether or not 
it was sincere, Blair benefited politically from the way in which he was able to reconcile 
parts of the left to New Labour. 
 
Second, New Labour’s opposition years show the value of an approach to reframing 
historical analysis which transcends divisions. Blair’s Australia lecture was a case in point. 
He criticised Labour’s left and right, and he lauded Labour’s left and right. Recognising 
the strengths and weaknesses of the different factions within the Labour Party is, to put it 
mildly, no longer a regular occurrence. Indeed just hours before the start of the 2019 
Labour Party Conference, the left of the party mobilized to abolish the post of Deputy 
Leader in what Tom Watson described as a ‘drive-by-shooting’. Blair denounced the 
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move and, interestingly, did so in a way intended to draw a clear contrast with his own 
leadership of accommodating different views. 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, Blair was undoubtedly part of an internal political struggle within 
the Labour Party. And he benefited, in this respect, from the struggles of both Neil Kinnock 
and then John Smith to marginalise the left. Yet Blair strengthened his position in so far 
as he was able to attack both the intellectual laziness and complacency of the right of the 
party as well as the failings of the left of the party. For the Labour modernisers today, 
recognising their weaknesses, and reaching out (truly) to other parts of the party feels like 
a risk. Yet, in the inevitable contests and struggles for power within the party just around 
the corner, those who can recognise the weakness of their ‘wing’ can more credibly lay 
claim to the strengths of the whole movement. It’s not just the ‘right’ thing to do if you 
believe in a cohesive, strengthened Labour Party. Strategically, it’s an attractive 
proposition to those who want to support the party. 
 
Third, the Labour politicians and strategists of today must recognise and remember the 
importance of the party’s ethos as well as its policies. In a classic account of the Labour 
Party, Henry Drucker defined ethos as the traditions, beliefs, procedures and feelings 
which ‘animate’ Labour.9 Identification with the rituals and language of the working class, 
either through birth or through a process of socialisation, are incredibly important to 
Labour’s ethos as well. Labour’s origins, and its ethos, includes consideration of the 
building of institutions as a defence for working class communities in the face of 
untrammelled market forces. It involves comprehending the language and acts of 
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‘solidarity’ among working people, and the cautious engagement with parliamentary 
politics. So too the relationship between working class communities, trade unions and 
political movements of Liberal, socialist (of which there are many variants) and Marxist 
forms, as well as the powerful influence of Christianity and its different sects in Britain. 
These add up to more than iconography, important as that is. They demonstrate a blend 
of motivations, aspirations and objectives, all present – quite legitimately – in the 
competing traditions of Labour’s ethos through the party’s history. 
 
The nature of shared and competing traditions is that Labour Party people agree on some 
issues – often the less controversial – and disagree on others. Things like party 
democracy, and the extent of leadership freedom on policymaking, are connected to the 
party’s ethos. The crude, but instructive divide between ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’ 
socialists speak to fundamentally different approaches to Labour politics and strategy, 
and this stems from the party’s ethos. Similarly, there is a constant tug and pull between 
those who claim to be ‘pragmatic’ and those who ‘stick to principle’. In reality, people 
display a blend of the two. These all affect policy – the doctrine – but they are matters of 
ethos. 
 
Why is this important to the debates about Blair and New Labour? We contend that Blair 
did not remake or seek to destroy Labour’s ethos – these are traditions both inscribed 
within the institution of the Labour Party, and beliefs held by people. Perhaps more 
importantly, we argue that Blair – in the opposition period we analyse in this article – was 
recognisably Labour in his interpretations of the party’s ethos and in his recognition of 
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dominant traditions in his party that he may not have subscribed to, but considered 
legitimate anyway. Blair blended radicalism with a government-in-waiting culture of 
competence. This was not simply a case of saying the right thing, ‘sounding’ Labour, or 
embracing parts of the party’s iconography. 
 
Blair’s Sedgefield constituency was critical to his political development and judgement, 
affording him the opportunity of connection with the party’s roots, and to the longstanding 
working class traditions of the Durham coalfield. This is not always easy to achieve. While 
challenging Corbyn in 2016 for the leadership, Owen Smith gave a newspaper interview 
in a café in his Pontypridd constituency. Receiving a ‘frothy coffee’, Smith ‘stopped mid-
sentence to express some amusement. “I tell you it is the first time I have ever been given 
little biscuits and a posh cup in here,” Smith said, looking up at the owner… “Seriously, I 
would have a mug normally,”’.10 Doubts over whether the South Wales MP really did 
normally have his cappuccino in a mug were raised. 
 
Fourth, you don’t have to have purely ‘centre ground policies’ to be perceived as attractive 
to voters located at the political centre. The Blair who worked for years to convince his 
party of a different kind of socialism, or social democracy, was very different to the Blair 
who left office focused on ‘policies that work’ or the more recent incarnation of Blair as 
someone seeking policies to define an electoral centre, rather than the other way around. 
The latter is reminiscent of the ‘non-political’ approach to politics that Blair associated with 
and used to attack the SDP.  The same can be said of the ‘Independent Group’ of MPs 
who, in their determination to present themselves as centrist, found it impossible to say 
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anything about any policy other than Brexit. Here ideology is confused with dogmatism, 
and the Blair of today has fallen into this trap. ‘Values’ are considered to be acceptable, 
but there is little in the way of a coherent political philosophy to steer and guide one’s 
politics. Instead, a ‘centre’, informed by public attitudes and responses to different policies 
or objectives, is identified. Such an approach to politics is inherently technocratic, 
because it is not based on ideas. It forgets, or willfully ignores for the sake of expedience, 
that the electorate believing a particular policy to be ‘centre ground’ will itself be a 
constructed belief. Public beliefs in a ‘centre’ for government spending over the last 
decade have been constructed, often skilfully, by politicians of right and left.11 
 
Our fifth and final point goes to the generational and cultural aspect of politics. Opposition 
politicians must not be caught out of time, fighting a battle that a younger generation has 
moved on from. In part, this includes recognising – as Blair did in his Australia lecture – 
that new generations of political actors and activists bring new ways of conducting politics, 
and new priorities to the table. This is not something to be resented. Indeed, age is a key 
divide electorally and advantageous for Labour. Labour’s famous ‘broad church’ must 




The lessons we offer for today’s Labour Party are based on the rejection of two common 
behaviours often on display: caricatures of Labour’s personalities and projects, past and 
present; and the denial of legitimacy for Labour’s competing traditions. Both behaviours 
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can appear attractive to the leaders of Labour’s factions. But the short term effects – 
aiding differentiation, helping to win an argument or a vote – are more than smothered by 
the long term costs. For Labour to not disintegrate over the next decade, its past and 
present leaders must be more honest and less divisive. 
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